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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
Overview 
 
 Historically, whistleblowers constitute a relatively new group in American society.  Of 
course, the efforts of earlier workers should not be undermined; they exposed malpractices in the 
workplace as they organized strikes to improve their wages and working conditions. However, 
the practice of whistleblowing as we know it today is a rather different and new phenomenon. 
This new group is characterized by employees who do not act solely out of self-interest but 
concentrate on the exposure of policies that have the potential to hurt the public (Grazer & 
Grazer, 1989).   
 A combination of societal and political factors in the 1960s created an ideal atmosphere 
for the perpetuation of this new type of ethical resister.  Glazer & Glazer (1989) note that public 
concern about toxic wastes, nuclear accidents, and dangerous drugs precipitated a series of new 
laws regulating the public and private sector, which protected workers who reported misconduct 
in the workplace.  There also existed widespread suspicion directed at the practices of the 
government and private industry over their perceived inability to control technological hazards as 
well as practices that seemed to threaten both the health and safety of employees and consumers 
(Glazer & Glazer, 1989).  As these elements culminated together, employees became more 
critical of their superiors’ law-breaking ways, fostering a sense of distrust directed towards their 
employers.  
 While the decade of the 1960s and the 1970s created an environment that was seemingly 
ripe for whistleblowing, this climate was not enough to spur workers to engage in 
whistleblowing. Glazer and Glazer (1989) explain that it was not until workers were finally 
provided an outlet for their concerns in the form of “new laws, the creation of regulatory 
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agencies, the development of public-interest groups, and the growing attention by Congress and 
the media to the prevalence of corruption” that employees felt more comfortable to blow the 
whistle (p. 12).  In response to the newly enforced regulatory measures over public and private 
industry, many government officials and corporate executives nevertheless refrained from 
implementing the necessary changes (Glazer & Glazer, 1989). Consequently, over the next few 
decades, a series of new whistleblower encouragement strategies were implemented to encourage 
the act of blowing the whistle.  State and federal laws were enacted, and there was a spurt in the 
creation of industry specific regulation agencies.   
 More recently, in the wake of immense corporate fraud as evidenced by companies such 
as Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, as well as a number of large-scale ponzi schemes, the American 
public has once again renewed its interest in the concept of whistleblowing (Ebersole, 2011). 
Today’s sense of mistrust seems to parallel, to some degree, the mistrust that was prevalent in the 
1960s and 1970s.  The rise of watchdog groups coupled with ever-increasing media scrutiny has 
lead to the proliferation of news stories that highlight misconduct in the workplace, leaving the 
American public skeptical of corporate practices.  In this environment, whistleblowers have 
emerged as another force behind the uncovering of illegitimate practices.  
 Whistleblowers have generally been praised in the media for sacrificing company loyalty 
in order to expose misconduct.  Though the public may praise them for their efforts, 
whistleblowers often face harsh criticisms from their organizations. As Elliston, Keenan, 
Lockhart, and van Schaik (1985a) note, whistleblower are often “labeled” or “stigmatized” 
through methods such as reducing their organizational status or power, as well as being called a 
traitor and sometimes even being fired (p. 28).  Because whistleblowers can face such serious 
retaliation, scholars have sought to analyze why certain people chose to blow the whistle while 
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others remain silent.  They found that a number of personal characteristics as well as certain 
situational factors might influence employees to engage in whistleblowing. For example, studies 
have shown that whistleblowers tend to be middle aged rather than younger, and they often have 
a strong sense of moral conviction (Elliston et al., 1985a).  In terms of contextual factors, for 
example, whistleblowers tend to come out of hierarchical organizational structures as opposed to 
more democratic organizations (Near & Miceli, 1996).   
 This thesis will aim to outline the characteristics most conducive to whistleblowing in 
order to answer the question of who is a whistleblower.  It will examine both the personality 
traits and situational factors most related to whistleblowing in order to form a more complete 
understanding of why someone may choose to blow the whistle.  In order to contextualize these 
characteristics, an in-depth examination of two recent whistleblowers will follow.  These two 
whistleblowers, Cynthia Cooper and Harry Markopolos, both wrote books that describe their 
experiences as whistleblowers.  Their stories not only demonstrate the personal and situational 
characteristics common to whistleblowing, but they also highlight the series of difficult decisions 
whistleblowers face during the whistleblowing process.  This process forces whistleblowers to 
confront their moral values on a continuous basis and places them in demanding situations.   
 Despite whistleblowers’ contributions to society, history has shown that protecting 
whistleblowers is often a complex and arduous task. Though research has shown that 
whistleblowing can benefit both the public and the organization itself, whistleblower legislation 
has often failed to provide whistleblowers with the comprehensive protection necessary to secure 
them against retaliation.  Nevertheless, in the past two decades, the government has implemented 
an increasing number of programs to encourage whistleblowing and it continues to pass 
legislation that minimizes retaliation against whistleblowers.  
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 The most recent efforts in this direction include the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-
Frank Act. Each revision to whistleblower laws, however, seems to come up short in fulfilling its 
stated goals.  Whistleblower protection agencies are not always competent enough to process 
whistleblower tips, and organizations find ways to resist or ignore protections that should be 
afforded to whistleblowers.  These consistent shortcomings beg the question whether 
whistleblowers can truly be protected by the law.       
 
 
Purpose 
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to examine a multitude of concepts related to the 
phenomenon of whistleblowing.  Chinn, Mufson, and Pearlman (2013) underline that we find 
ourselves “in the age of the whistleblower” and it is therefore imperative to understand this new 
phenomenon.  The visibility of whistleblowers in the media is increasing but whistleblowers are 
not always portrayed accurately, and, as such, it may be beneficial to examine them in a more 
legitimate context.  As whistleblowers can provide a tremendous service to the public, their 
organization, and the current economic situation, it is in society’s best interest to understand the 
whistleblowing process in order to encourage its expansion.  
 The first half of the thesis examines the logistics of the whistleblowing process, the 
characterization of a whistleblower, and the various groups that can benefit from the 
whistleblowing phenomenon.  This in depth analysis aims to dispel any misconceptions about 
whistleblowing and provides readers with a comprehensive overview of the literature available 
on whistleblower dynamics.  
 The second half of the thesis reviews whistleblower laws from their foundation nearly 
two centuries ago all the way to current developments in whistleblower legislation.  It analyzes 
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the strengths and deficiencies of various legal measures and seeks to demonstrate why 
whistleblower legislation may never fully afford whistleblowers the comprehensive protection 
they deserve.   This section will argue that, though whistleblower legislation has certainly 
improved in aiming to promote whistleblowing, certain deficiencies remain a permanent part of 
whistleblower law.        
 
Organization 
       The following is an outline for the thesis, which will be divided into seven chapters: 
I.  Introduction 
II. Who is a Whistleblower? 
III. Whistleblower Examples: A Characterization of Two Recent Whistleblowers 
IV. The Role of a Whistleblower 
V. The History of Whistleblower Legislation 
VI. Recent Developments in Whistleblower Law 
VII. Conclusion 
 
 After the introductory chapter, which provides a brief overview of the history of 
whistleblowing, the second chapter begins by addressing a series of definitional concerns. It also 
outlines the whistleblowing process in a step-by-step manner. The third chapter focuses on 
attempting to answer the question “who is a whistleblower?” by examining the personal 
characteristics of a whistleblower as well as the situational factors that may encourage an 
employee to blow the whistle.  The next chapter outlines the role of a whistleblower, underlining 
the various benefits of whistleblowing.   
 After addressing theoretical considerations, the thesis then shifts its attention to analyzing 
whistleblower legislation.  The fifth chapter traces the development of whistleblower law from 
1871 and discusses federal measures as well as industry specific whistleblower protections.  The 
sixth chapter focuses on major whistleblower legislation reforms of the last decade and examines 
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their effectiveness.  Finally, the conclusion will argue that despite the obstacles that 
whistleblowers face, whistleblowing will continue to exist and may even increase even if 
whistleblower legislation is not able to promise full protection.   
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Chapter 2: Who is a Whistleblower? 
  
 Over the past few decades, courtroom records and media accounts seem to suggest that 
the phenomenon of whistleblowing is on the rise (Greenberger, Miceli & Cohen, 1987).  The 
media’s sensationalizing of the whistleblower and the often large-scale wrongdoing they expose, 
however, would have us fooled that the whistleblowing process is as alluring as the media 
presents.  In reality, the potential whistleblower finds themself in an extremely difficult situation, 
weighing the decision of whether he or she should potentially sacrifice company “loyalty” and 
expose their concerns, or remain silent despite their knowledge of misconduct.   
 The whistleblowing process is an intricate one as it involves a number of actors, a series 
of tough decisions, and a plethora of uncontrollable factors.  The whistleblower must therefore 
make a number of cost-benefit analyses as the outcome of their decision to act remains uncertain.  
If they do indeed decide to blow the whistle, they must further determine how and to whom they 
should address their concerns and make subsequent decisions based upon the response they 
receive.    
 The complicated and often stressful nature of whistleblowing begs the question: who is a 
whistleblower? If the whistleblowing process is an uncomfortable experience and whistleblowers 
nevertheless engage in it, it seems logical that there must exist some factors that differentiate 
whistleblowers from inactive observers.  Academics have studied these factors extensively, 
focusing on both personal characteristics of the whistleblower as well as context-related 
explanations. Though some of their findings may be inconsistent, there appear to exist a number 
of commonalities.    
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Definitional Concerns and The Whistleblowing Process 
 The substantial amount of literature available on whistleblowing is often contradictory, 
and opinions on the topic are frequently inconsistent.  Disagreements range from issues such as 
the importance of whistleblowing, to the motivations behind blowing the whistle, to the methods 
that should be used to encourage whistleblowing.  According to Miceli, Rehg, Near, and Ryan 
(1999) even defining the term whistleblowing has proved to be controversial.  As such, it would 
prove beneficial to address definitional concerns in order to clarify the approach that will be used 
here.    
 The definition of whistleblowing that will be employed is offered by Near and Miceli 
(1985) as, “the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may 
be able to effect action” (p. 4). Whether they choose to remain anonymous or not, this includes 
employees who use internal channels, external channels, or both to report the wrongdoing they 
have observed.  Internal channels constitute reporting to someone within the organization, such 
as personnel and human resource managers, and external channels, by contrast, include actors 
outside of the organization (Miceli & Near, 1988).  Since most whistleblowers who use external 
channels have also used internal channels (Miceli & Near, 1985), and empirical results have 
demonstrated that the whistleblowing process tends to be the same in both cases (Miceli & Near, 
1992), it is appropriate that we include both of these methods in our definition. 
    In addition to addressing definitional concerns, it is worthwhile to expand upon the 
whistleblowing process itself. By examining the development of a whistleblowing situation, it is 
possible to gain insight into this phenomenon and gain a deeper understanding of the types of 
decisions that whistleblowers must confront.  Most models of the whistleblowing process 
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contend that the process begins with a ‘triggering event’ (Henik, 2008a) in which the 
whistleblower recognizes the wrongdoing (Miceli, Near, & Schwenek, 1991).  It is during this 
stage that the whistleblower may experience a value conflict as he or she attempts to adjust their 
perspective of the organization or employer based on their sense of right and wrong (Henik, 
2008a).   
 Afterwards, the individual must assess whether the observed wrongful activity is 
intolerable enough to constitute being reported.  If the employee does indeed decide to blow the 
whistle, he or she determines what actions are available at their disposal and weighs the expected 
costs and benefits of their decision (Miceli et al, 1991).  The person may communicate their 
concerns to their coworkers, supervisor or sometimes the perpetrator themselves.  These are 
considered internal channels of communication.  As Richardson, Wang, and Hall (2012) note, 
the next stage includes a response from the organization and the employee’s analysis of this 
response.  The whistleblower determines whether further action is warranted, and may turn to 
external measures if they find themselves unsatisfied with the employer’s response.   
  As Elliston et al. (1985a) underscore, “whistleblowing itself is the final stage of a 
process that begins in an awareness of…an unethical activity, [and] it grows and takes shape 
through discussions with coworkers to clarify one’s initial worries” (p.27).  The actual act of 
whistleblowing is therefore extremely varied and circumstantial.  Subsequently, it will not be 
considered here in depth; however, the reasoning behind why a whistleblower may choose one 
channel of dissemination over another will be examined at a later time.  Though the above model 
serves as a general outline of the process of whistleblowing, it should be noted that various 
decisions and tradeoffs are made at every level of the process, which causes each whistleblowing 
case to be unique; as such, no whistleblowing case can be characterized as typical (Near & 
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Miceli, 1996).  Nevertheless, this model adequately serves as a general framework for the type of 
internal debates a potential whistleblower experiences.   
 The manner in which the organization responds to the whistleblower can also vary.  
Greenberger et al. (1987) provide a list of possible reactions which include: “attempts to 
persuade the whistleblower of errors, increased communication directed to whistleblower, social 
rejection of whistleblower, and punishment of whistleblower” (p. 535).  Scholars most often tend 
to focus on the retaliation towards whistleblowers as many of the employer’s responses can be 
understood as such, whether they are more or less severe.   
 Certain factors of whistleblowing have been found to be related to the likelihood that 
retaliation will occur. For example, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) explain that the 
action taken by the whistleblower, such as the use of external channels, may lead to a greater 
likelihood and severity of retaliation (p. 282).  On the other hand, studies have found that general 
characteristics of the whistleblower such as education, job level, or age tend to be less predictive 
of retaliation than contextual factors (Miceli and Near, 2002).  
 
Characteristics of a Whistleblower: Personal Characteristics 
 
 Amongst the available literature on whistleblowing, there exist disputes over the question 
of whether whistleblowers share common personality traits.  Certain scholars attribute predictors 
of whistleblowing to be instead based on situational characteristics and consider personality to be 
much less of a determining factor.  Nevertheless, despite the dispute over the degree to which 
personality traits play a role in blowing the whistle, most scholars agree on the existence of at 
least a few commonalities.  Indeed, as Jos, Tompkins, & Hays (1989) suggest, there must be 
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something that prompts whistleblowers to jeopardize their careers, risk ostracism, and suffer 
potential retaliation while their coworkers remain silent.    
 In response to the question above, Elliston et al. (1985a)  suggest that, “whistleblowers 
must have relatively high ideals, staunch principles. . . and feel a strong obligation to ‘take 
action’ rather than compromise their standards by remaining silent” (p. 26).  As opposed to silent 
observers, whistleblowers not only have a stronger sense of commitment to their values, but they 
are also capable of acting on their obligations even in the face of pressures to do otherwise (Jos 
et al., 1989).  As such, a large majority of whistleblowers are seemingly uninterested in altering 
their behavior in order to conform to the situation at hand (Jos et al.,1989).  Because of their 
strong value system, whistleblowers may often feel anger towards the organization or 
perpetrators of the wrongdoing and subsequently seek to restore moral order (Henik, 2008b).    
 Ideological convictions, whether based on professional values or religious beliefs, may 
also constitute a shared personality trait among whistleblowers.  Both of these foster a sense of 
obligation coupled with a sense of community that may encourage employees to blow the 
whistle.  In the case of professional values, professional organizations in fields such as law, 
medicine, and engineering are largely responsible for fostering strong ideologies (Glazer & 
Glazer, 1989).   Glazer and Glazer (1989) ascertain that among the members of these 
organizations, whistleblowers tend to take the ideology of their profession most seriously, and 
they commit themselves to upholding these professional values; they have a certain “red line” 
that they will not cross, and they will not compromise their judgments (p. 70).  In an interview 
conducted by Henik (2008a) in which whistleblowers were asked about their motivations for 
exposing wrongdoing, one interviewee was quoted as saying: 
When you come on board…in the government, you swear an oath to the Constitution 
and to defend it against enemies foreign and domestic.  I’m not deciding you’re an 
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enemy. All I know is that I’ve got a bunch of rules. I am obliged to report various 
things under the circumstance. . . It’s not a choice.  I was actually told one time. . . 
that I should use a little more discretion  when I pick and choose which rules to 
follow. . . that was the first time I’d ever heard that. You don’t get to pick and 
choose which rules to follow (p. 61). 
 
 Like those with strong professional values, those employees who have strong belief 
systems also have a more difficult time compromising their values.  Glazer and Glazer (1989) 
contend that well developed belief systems can aid people in withstanding the pressures to 
conform to the wrongdoing, and they argue that religious teachings can be effective in 
encouraging a sense of individual responsibility.  Another whistleblower in the same interview 
with Henik (2008a) cited religious reasons for whistleblowing:  
I have an extremely strong sense of faith and ethics in a Christian context. . . And I 
believe, at the end of the day, this is what makes me. . . different from a lot of 
people you find in [my organization]. I’m a Christian, and I have a higher 
obligation to God than to anyone, government or military agency.  And my ethics in 
handling the matter was always of the highest importance to me because ultimately 
we are all going to answer to  God for our impunities.  And I was not afraid to 
answer to God for what I was doing. . . . (p. 61). 
 
The sense of community fostered by both professional and religious communities can indeed 
influence a potential whistleblower to commit the action.  
 In addition to their strong value system, whistleblowers also possess a strong need to 
control their surroundings. Barton (1995) emphasizes that whistleblowers possess “a higher than 
average need to control their environment and believe that the absence of controls could 
jeopardize progress in the organization” (p. 300).  This need for a “locus of control” (Rotter, 
1966) can lead whistleblowers to believe that their actions have a substantial impact on what 
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happens to them and that their actions can make a difference in the world (Dozier & Miceli, 
1985).     
 Demographically and professionally, there seem to be a number of traits linked to 
whistleblowers.  For example, more whistleblowers tend to be married and middle aged as 
opposed to single and younger (Barton, 1995).  There seems to be less consistency regarding the 
gender of whistleblowers; some studies found that a greater proportion of males are 
whistleblowers (Miceli and Near, 1988), while other studies found a positive correlation between 
whistleblowing and being female (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). In a professional 
context, Miceli and Near (1988) note that whistleblowers have higher levels of professional 
status than those who observed wrongdoing but chose not to report it. Near and Miceli (1996) 
indicate that whistleblowers are also more likely to have high job performance, while Miceli and 
Near (1988) suggest that employees who feel respected or powerful will be more likely to blow 
the whistle.   
 According to Greenberger et al. (1987), high performers who are perceived as competent 
have a higher credibility and are therefore at a greater liberty to deviate from the status quo 
without fear of retaliation.  As Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) explain, “an individual 
with more experience, tenure, and better job performance is more valuable to an organization, 
thus giving them some leverage to report misdeeds” (as cited in Miceli and Near, 2002). By this 
logic, observers of wrong doing with poor job performance may believe that their opinion is less 
influential and their position more susceptible to retaliation; as such, low performers may be less 
likely to blow the whistle (Miceli et al., 1991).  Indeed, a more recent study about the incidence 
of whistleblowing in sexual harassment cases found that “more vulnerable targets are more likely 
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to suffer retaliation from powerful harassers, especially if they have blown the whistle multiple 
times” (Lee, Heilmann, & Near, 2004, p. 316).  
 High performing, experienced employees are also most likely to hold higher positions 
within the organizational hierarchy, which may be related to a higher rate of whistleblowing.  
Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) argue that, “individuals demonstrating higher 
organizational commitment are more invested in staying with the organization” and are therefore 
more likely to blow the whistle as opposed to exiting the organization (p. 280).  These employees 
are more invested in the organization, and they therefore see a greater value to voicing their 
concerns. In contrast to younger workers, older employees may also feel more comfortable 
upholding their value system, and, consequently, more willing to defend it during the lengthy 
and sometimes retaliation-ridden whistleblowing process (Chiu, 2003).  Because they have 
worked at the organization for a longer period of time, they are likely to have a greater 
appreciation of and commitment to the values of the workplace and, subsequently, a greater 
motivation to protect its culture (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005).    
  In addition to their high work performance, whistleblowers tend to have a meaningful 
connection to their workplace and a genuine interest in seeing it succeed.  Elliston et al. (1985a) 
emphasize that, “they tend to be conscientious employees who identify closely with the 
organization” (p. 26). Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) contend that whistleblowing is 
greater in organizations in which the “whistleblower perceives a high congruence between 
personal and organizational values” (p. 280).    Whistleblowers may truly believe in and dedicate 
themselves to fulfilling the explicit goals of the company, and they take their roles within the 
organization very seriously (Elliston et al., 1985a).   
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Characteristics of a Whistleblower: Situational Factors 
 
 Among scholars, certain situational factors are more readily agreed upon as to their 
perceived predictability for whistleblowing.  One such factor suggests that whistleblowers are in 
large part influenced by their workplace environment and organizational structure.  Elliston et al. 
(1985a) highlight this point by arguing that, “since whistleblowing is an action taken by an 
employee against the organization, the nature of the organization is itself a factor” (p. 28).  They 
conclude that problems and tensions are more likely to occur in large-scale organizations that 
employ professionals because professional requirements can often come into conflict with 
organizational needs (Elliston et al., 1985a).   
 Professionals who are employed in technical roles have a deep knowledge and 
understanding of highly specialized fields which are outside of the expertise of their managers.  
As a result of this specialization of roles, alienation between managers and professionals is more 
likely to occur (Elliston et al., 1985a). Bureaucratic organizations, however, require 
coordination, which is achieved through managerial support, but professionals often believe that 
they should not be subject to external control and that their authority should instead rest on their 
expertise (Elliston et al. 1985a).  In situations where managers pressure professionals to continue 
their work despite potentially dangerous technical issues, an employee may be moved to blow 
the whistle (Elliston et al., 1985a).   
 The disconnect between professionals and managers in terms of their occupational 
associations can also lend itself to a whistleblowing phenomenon.  While management tends to 
have a greater loyalty to the organization, professionals generally submit their loyalties to greater 
professional associations.  As opposed to their supervisors, they may feel a greater sense of 
identification with those who share their professional interests. Ellisten et al. (1985a) underline 
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that professionals often use these “reference groups” or “significant others”  “when making 
assessments or judgments on questions of professional concern” thereby bypassing their 
employer’s expectations and demands (p. 30).  When a conflict emerges between the employer’s 
expectations and a professional code of ethics, whistleblowing may serve as one solution 
(Elliston et al., 1985a).    
 This employee-employer relationship also demonstrates how the nature of hierarchical 
organizational structures can influence whistleblowing.  For example, decentralized 
organizational structures are less threated by whistleblowing because they encourage equal 
participation amongst their employees.  Gundlach, Martinko, and Douglas (2003) explain that 
this is because, “a decentralized organizational structure is conducive to encouraging ethical 
decision making at all levels” (p. 47).  On the other hand, bureaucratic organizations are more 
likely to threatened by whistleblowers (Near and Miceli, 1996).  Because bureaucracies are 
predicated on the notion that managers hold authority over their superiors, any type of challenge 
to their decisions undermines the entire structure of the organization (Near and Miceli, 1996).  
As such, bureaucracies are more likely to ignore or retaliate against whistleblowers to discourage 
opposition.  Correspondingly, because bureaucracies are generally less open to reform than other 
organizations, and the goal of whistleblowing is to facilitate change, bureaucracies are at a 
greater threat to experience whistleblowing behavior (Near and Miceli, 1996).  
 Whistleblowing is also more likely to occur in organizations that support whistleblowing 
(Near & Miceli, 1996).  Elliston et al. (1985a) conclude that if top management neither values 
nor rewards employees who report unethical and questionable behavior, then whistleblowing is 
less likely to occur. On the other hand, Gundlach, Martinko and Douglas (2008) suggest that, 
“By understanding the causal attributions associated with employees’ perceptions, and by taking 
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their cognitive and emotional concerns seriously, managers can build trust within their 
organizations and benefit from learning how things operate in the eyes of all employees” (p. 46).  
By fostering an open dialogue with employees and enforcing mechanisms that allow them to 
voice their concerns, management can encourage a positive result to the whistleblowing process 
(Gundlach et al., 2008).  
 In addition to specific structural factors, certain characteristics of the wrongdoing itself 
can be responsible for yielding a higher incidence of whistleblowing. Depending on how gravely 
the employee foresees the consequences of the wrongdoing will in large part determine their 
decision to blow the whistle (Henik, 2008a).  Near and Miceli (1996) adroitly point out, 
however, that “reasonable people may differ on what constitutes wrongdoing” (p. 509).  
Consequently, this factor has been disputed among researchers.    
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Chapter 3:  
Whistleblower Examples: A Characterization of Two Recent Whistleblowers 
 
 
 In order to contextualize the whistleblowing process as well as the personal and 
situational characteristics associated with whistleblowing, it may prove beneficial to examine 
actual examples of the whistleblowing phenomenon.  The following chapter will focus on 
Cynthia Cooper and Harry Markopolos, two of the more recently publicized whistleblowers.  
Cooper was the whistleblower behind the WorldCom corporate accounting scandal in the early 
2000s, while Markopolos was responsible for documenting almost a decade of evidence on 
Bernie Madoff’s ponzi scheme, which was exposed in 2008.   
 Each case highlights the personal characteristics of Cooper and Markopolos consistent 
with typical whistleblower characterizations.  Both relied upon their strong value system to 
continue investigations of misconduct despite consistent failure to bring about real change.  Their 
highly technical expertise aided them in their discovery of wrongdoing, but simultaneously 
caused tension with management.  In addition to personal factors, structural characteristics are 
also considered. Organizational concerns at WorldCom and the institutional failure of the SEC to 
apprehend Madoff cannot be overstated and will be further analyzed.   
 
 
Cynthia Cooper 
  
 When Cynthia Cooper became aware of the massive fraud at her workplace, she was 
perhaps at the pinnacle of her career: she was 37 years old and the Vice President of Internal 
Audit at WorldCom.  WorldCom, one of the largest telecommunication companies at the time, 
boasted some of the greatest acquisition and debt offerings in corporate history (Cooper, 2008).  
As Cooper (2008) notes, it delivered some of the highest returns on Wall Street, its stock became 
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the fifth-most widely held, and the Wall Street Journal ranked it Number One in return to 
shareholders over a ten-year period.  Despite its success, Cynthia Cooper felt that something had 
gone awry at WorldCom and through her efforts, she exposed $3.8 billion in fraud, though the 
amount would ultimately grow to $11 billion. 
 Cynthia’s suspicions about the soundness of WorldCom’s financial statements began to 
form in the summer of 2002.  As the Vice President of the Internal Audit committee, it was her 
responsibility to inspect the company’s financial records and yet, as she and her team probed 
deeper into the entries of the WorldCom books, they were met with increasing hostility and 
unforeseen roadblocks from their superiors. At first, company presidents assured Cooper that she 
was wasting her time auditing unnecessary areas of the company.  Over time, she was asked to 
delay her audit work, and eventually, she was overtly humiliated and threatened for continuing to 
investigate questionable financial statements.  
 Cooper’s ties to WorldCom were meaningful, and she greatly revered her position in the 
company as it demonstrated her profound commitment to her profession as an accountant.  Like 
many whistleblowers, she had a deep connection to the company and a vested interest in seeing it 
succeed. Her involvement in WorldCom began early; she joined the team when WorldCom, then 
known as Long Distance Discount Services (LDDS), was still an underdog, regional company 
and only but a speck in the telecom industry (Cooper, 2008).  In her first eight years, however, 
she witnessed the company grow from $1.5 billion in revenue to $38 billion and become an 
international giant in the telecom business.  Cooper’s division in WorldCom also went through a 
staggering transformation.  Her career at WorldCom began by establishing a start-up Internal 
Audit group with a mere two inexperienced staff members and under her behest, she witnessed 
its transformation to a competent division, well respected by her coworkers.  
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  For Cooper, her occupation was not simply a manner through which to acquire means, 
but a personal challenge and a source of pride. Her beginnings at WorldCom were not easy—she 
spent a significant portion of her time convincing management of the value of an internal 
auditing committee and persuading them to allocate more resources to her department.  
The highly technical and specialized nature of Cooper’s profession was often beyond the 
understanding of her managers, however, leading them to disregard the importance of her work 
(Elliston et al. 1985a).  This situational characteristic of whistleblowing was as the forefront of 
her troubles at WorldCom, but her commitment to her profession drove her to persevere.  
Despite the obstacles, Cooper (2008) admits that, “at some point, perseverance wins out.  I don’t 
just want to quit. I’ve worked too hard, and I still feel confident that if I can just get a little 
support, I can build a team of well-qualified auditors who can add value to this company” (p. 
113).   
 Cooper was personally invested in building a successful auditing group at WorldCom, 
and she would not admit defeat.  She even went so far as to call a meeting with the CEO to 
explain the basics of internal auditing, calling attention to how internal controls could help the 
company and management meet their objectives (Cooper, 2008). Aside from internal controls 
constituting an important facet of Cooper’s occupation, her commitment and unwavering faith in 
internal controls demonstrates a higher than average need to control her surroundings, a very 
common whistleblower personality trait.  As Barton (1995) explains, whistleblowers have a 
heightened need to control their environment, as they believe that an absence of controls could 
endanger progress in the company.  Cooper’s persistence in trying to establish these controls 
therefore serves to demonstrate the close tie between situational and personal characteristics in 
the whistleblowing process.    
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 Cooper’s efforts eventually proved fruitful as management began to respond positively to 
the auditing committee’s findings and put many of its recommendations into place.  This strong-
willed commitment to her profession demonstrates a common situational factor in 
whistleblowing. Whistleblowers are often professionals employed in highly technical roles, 
which lie beyond the expertise of their managers, and they therefore believe that their authority 
should rest on their highly specialized skills.  Consequently, they believe they should be exempt 
from the general, organizational external controls to which managers attempt to conform them 
(Elliston et al. 1985a).  This often leads to a tense relationship between whistleblower and 
management because of their differing objectives.  Cooper’s experiences certainly followed this 
trend. 
 While Cynthia’s passionate commitment to her profession demonstrates the situational 
factors consistent with whistleblowing, it also crosses into the realm of whistleblower personality 
traits.  She is a determined person in all aspects of life, unwilling to settle for the status quo.  In 
reminiscing about her childhood and teenage years, Cooper underlines that she was very resolute 
in her endeavors, though they were often unconventional. Cooper (2008) emphasizes that she 
was “a bit of a free spirit and somewhat single-minded” (p. 16).  
 One memory is particularly illuminating of Cooper’s commitment to her obligations, 
which some may see as extreme.  She recounts a story of working as a waitress, admitting that 
she was not very good at balancing plates and began to notice that her hours were significantly 
cut down.  Unwilling to fail as a waitress, she requested that her father buy weights so that she 
could “bulk up” and carry more platters.  Eventually, she began to work more hours and her 
manager confronted her admitting, “You were the worst waitress I ever hired.  I did everything I 
could to get you to leave and you just wouldn’t quit. Now you’re one of the best waitresses I 
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have” (p. 38).  This personality trait is certainly something that carried over into her career at 
WorldCom.  Despite serious obstacles, she was never willing to surrender her position.     
 Another of Cooper’s personality traits that is in line with the whistleblowing phenomenon 
is her sense of moral conviction, fostered through both her religious community and strong 
familial ties.  Both of these can offer whistleblowers a sense of a higher purpose and discourage 
them from overlooking wrongs perpetrated by their workplace. Cooper had both her religion and 
her family to serve as a foundation during troubling times.  Cooper (2008) notes that some of the 
most influential people in her life were her church pastors and her youth minister, and as she 
began to face increasing pressures at WorldCom, she prayed saying, “God please give me 
strength in making the right decisions” (p. 242).   
 Like many whistleblowers, Cooper was unwilling to compromise her values.  In a 2008 
Time interview, she articulated that looking back, she would still take the same course of action.  
She expressed that, “I really found myself at a crossroads where there was only one right path to 
take” (Ripley, 2008). In addition to her strong belief system, Cooper’s parents as well as her 
husband were also particularly supportive both during and after the whistleblowing process, 
encouraging her to act in line with her convictions.  
 Cooper also fits the demographic description of a “typical” whistleblower.  She received 
a high level of education, acquiring an undergraduate and master’s degree in accounting.  She 
was married and middle-aged when she decided to blow the whistle, both of which are 
characteristic of whistleblowers.  Her position professionally also fits a number of typical 
whistleblower traits: she had a high level of professional status, high job performance, and felt 
relatively respected amongst her coworkers (Miceli and Near, 1988).  
	   27 
 Cooper became aware of the troubles at WorldCom in the summer of 2000, two years 
before the fraud was made public. She explains that, though the original organizational structure 
of the company was able to retain a “strong spirit of camaraderie” during its early years, it 
eventually turned unstable as the company made a number of serious acquisitions (Cooper, 2008, 
p. 73).  Cooper (2008) explains that WorldCom became “a patchwork of companies piled one on 
top of another.  The result [was] an environment that [was] never stable and a quagmire of 
duplicate systems and processes” (p. 95).  The CEO continued to run the company like a mom-
and-pop business, though it was now worth almost $40 billion.   
 The first signs of fraud, however, were actually brought to Cooper’s attention by the 
CEO, who believed that sales representatives manipulated commissions payments (Cooper, 
2008).  While Cooper was praised for her work in exposing commissions fraud, when she 
mentioned that internal control weaknesses were the culprit, her supervisor became irritated.  As 
she started to expose more serious problems and present them to management, she was asked her 
to alter her findings and humiliated at Audit Board meetings.   
 Over time, it became increasingly harder for Cooper to access the information needed to 
complete her job.  Her supervisor began to delineate which projects she was allowed to take on, 
something he had never done before.  When Cooper and her auditing team finally noticed that 
large amounts of money were nonsensically moved through different accounts, which turned out 
to be at the core of the fraud, senior managers contacted Cooper to inform her that she was 
wasting time and company resources on a negligible task (Cooper, 2008).  As Cooper unearthed 
increasingly serious misconduct, she no longer used internal means to voice her concerns.  
Whistleblowers tend to first use internal means to express their findings but are often dismissed 
and instead move to external means to expose their findings.  After being yelled at, mocked, and 
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berated, Cooper decided to keep the information to herself and worked after hours so as not to be 
distracted by management.   
 On June 25, 2002, WorldCom submitted their first press release acknowledging that they 
had misstated their financial statements (Cooper, 2008).  Cooper was immediately thrown into 
the media blitz surrounding the scandal as the company whistleblower.  Cooper (2008) 
emphasizes, however, that, “the last thing I want is to be in the headlines.  I’m comfortable 
leading a private life” (p. 277).  She was unable to go about her regular life as she constantly hid 
from reporters who even followed her onto her home’s driveway.  As media scrutiny of 
WorldCom was at its peak, Cooper nevertheless continued to work in the tense environment, but 
the ordeal quickly began to take an emotional and physical toll on her life. Cooper (2008) 
explains that, “the control over my life that I used to feel vanished, replaced by feelings of 
depression and anxiety.  I had done what I believed was right, but there’s an emotional and 
physical price.  There’s rarely a moment when I don’t feel nauseous.  I have trouble falling 
asleep….” (p. 283).   
 The emotional consequences she experienced, like in many cases of whistleblowing, are 
two fold—not only did Cooper feel a sense of personal despair and loneliness, she was also 
overcome with intense feelings of pity for her fellow coworkers associated with the fraud.  
Furthermore, it was technically as a result of her involvement that many of them were now under 
investigation.  As the FBI searched the offices, Cooper (2008) articulates how she felt, “My team 
and I watch as people we’ve worked with for years lose their jobs and leave the building carrying 
their belongings in small cardboard boxes…People we work with may be facing prison.  And 
they aren’t just numbers to us.  They are people we have known for a long time, trusted and 
respected.  Many of us know their children, husbands, and wives…” (p. 285).  
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 Cooper eventually quit her job at WorldCom.  The experience of being a whistleblower 
was certainly draining, and she now spends a lot of her time sharing lessons of her experience 
with both professional groups and students (Cooper, 2008). It should be noted that Cynthia’s 
experiences as a whistleblower followed a somewhat common trajectory of the whistleblowing 
process and therefore provide us with an illuminating glimpse into the whistleblowing 
phenomenon.   
  
Harry Markopolos 
 
 The name Bernie Madoff is now almost synonymous with ponzi scheme.  In 2008, it was 
finally exposed that Madoff defrauded his investors of $65 billion by employing a relatively 
simple ponzi scheme structure. Perhaps the logistics are not simple to the untrained eye, but a 
number of financiers were attune to the suspicious activities.  One of them, Harry Markopolos, 
tracked Madoff’s scheme for an entire nine years before it was finally exposed.  Despite his 
continuous efforts, Markopolos was not able to stop Madoff, but when the fraud finally came to 
the limelight, Markopolos offered the public a meticulously documented record of Madoff’s 
actions.  He may not have been able to stop the greatest financial crime in history, but thanks to 
his efforts, not only was the extent of Madoff’s crime thoroughly documented, the inefficiency of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and whistleblower legislation was also publically 
exposed.   
 When Markopolos began his investigation of Bernie Madoff, he was working as an 
assistant portfolio manager.  Markopolos (2010) was a quant and a self-proclaimed “nerd” who 
enjoyed “watching the choreography of numbers” (p. 9).  Like many whistleblowers before him, 
he had a highly technical expertise that strayed beyond the understanding of his managers. 
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Markopolos’ expertise lied in the field of finance; he was capable of conceptualizing associations 
between numbers that most people were not even aware existed (Markopolos, 2010).  
  Throughout the nine year ordeal, Markpolos remained working in the finance sector but 
despite his passion for numbers, he was disillusioned by the overwhelming ethical breaches in 
the industry.  As Elliston et al. (1985a) note, whistleblowers tend to have firm ideals and “feel a 
strong obligation to ‘take action’ rather than compromise their standards” (p. 26).  Markopolos 
had an extremely firm ethical backing and could not compromise his values with the corruption 
he witnessed on a daily basis.  Harry (2010) expressed that:  
 What surprised me from the very beginning of my career was the level of corruption that 
 was simply an accepted way of doing business. . . I became disillusioned very quickly. . . 
 I don’t know where my education went wrong but my brother and I had been taught that 
 there was no such thing as a minor lapse of ethics.  Either you were honest or you were 
 not. It was not possible to be partly honest. (p. 12) 
 
Furthermore, Markopolos (2010) was of the opinion that “good ethics demands action” (p. 3). 
Though Markopolos realized that stock-trading violations occurred on a daily basis, he refused to 
accept them as normal, and reported them regularly despite the SEC’s inaction (Markopolos, 
2010). He understood that it was an accepted way of conducting business, but he refused to 
compromise his judgments and partake in the corrupt “business as usual” structure.   
 Harry’s initial interest in Madoff’s impressive returns was a matter of curiosity.  Madoff 
was highly praised in the finance community and as Markopolos (2010) explains, he and his 
team “simply wanted to know how he made his numbers dance” (p. 20).  He quickly realized that 
Madoff’s successful returns were numerically impossible and could not be explained without 
some type of fraudulent basis.  Despite alerting management of his suspicions, Harry’s superiors 
nevertheless incessantly pushed him to produce the same types of profits as Madoff.  As with the 
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case of Cynthia Cooper, Markopolos’ managers did not possess the technical expertise to fully 
comprehend the importance of his work.  He was finally aggravated enough by their insistence to 
replicate Madoff’s returns that his anger served that the triggering event to report Madoff to the 
SEC (Markopolos, 2010).   
 What followed was not the exposure of Madoff’s scheme, but the exposure of the 
extreme inadequacy of the SEC to accomplish the job appointed to them.  Over 9 years, 
Markopolos submitted three separate reports on the Madoff ponzi scheme and met with several 
members of the commission; all of his efforts ultimately proved fruitless.  Despite an 
overwhelming amount of evidence to convict Madoff, his appeals were consistently dismissed. 
After Madoff’s fraud was unearthed, it became exposed that none of the SEC agents had ever 
even investigated a Ponzi scheme and would therefore be oblivious to its warning signs. 
Markopolos (2010) hypothesized that, “as part of the bureaucracy they didn’t want to look 
unqualified or unprepared by asking someone like me for assistance” (p. 140).   
 After growing disillusioned with the SEC’s inability to handle a case of this magnitude, 
Harry Markopoulos embarked on a new career path.  With the hopes of receiving payments from 
the SEC under their bounty program (a program that pays whistleblower a portion of the fraud 
they expose), Markpolos formed an investigating organization that examined smaller scale fraud.  
Ultimately, the SEC dropped all 20 cases the day he filed them. He had wasted his time, money, 
and professional expertise only to emerge empty-handed. Not only did whistleblowing take a 
professional toll on Markopolos, it was also a psychologically draining experience.  Markopolos  
(2010) explains:  
 Being a whistleblower is an extraordinarily lonely existence.  You’re putting your 
 livelihood at risk, maybe your life, and you can’t tell anyone about it.  You have to go 
 through every workday as if everything is normal, when in fact you’ve made a conscious 
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 decision to expose illegal actions your company is taking, and you’re doing it with the 
 knowledge that the people you work with are going to suffer because of that, and some of 
 them may even go to jail (p. 120). 
 
This experience was accompanied by a sense of paranoia. The greater the fraud Markopolos 
uncovered, the more worried he became for his personal safety and the safety of his family.  He 
regularly looked over his shoulder when walking down the street and checked his car for 
possible explosives, feeling that retaliation was imminent (Markopolos, 2010). His fears were 
not unfounded; if someone took enough interest to listen to Markopolos’ claims, the information 
he possessed would have been severely damaging. 
 Unfortunately, Markopolos was unable to expose Bernie Madoff’s scheme in time to 
protect thousands of investors.  Instead, he exposed the widespread ineptitude of the SEC and 
their failure to protect whistleblowers and promote their cause.  As Markopoloes (2010) argues, 
“The magnitude of this Ponzi scheme [was] matched only by the willful blindness of the SEC to 
investigate Madoff” (p. 8). His whistleblowing, however, did not go unnoticed or unappreciated, 
and lead to serious revision in whistleblowing laws. Markopolos’ concerns about the 
shortcomings of the SEC as well as their failure to accommodate whistleblowers will be further 
discussed in Chapter 4.   
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Chapter 4: The Role of a Whistleblower 
 
 
 The manner in which whistleblowers are portrayed varies depending on who is describing 
them.  Concerned consumers see them as heroes while bruised companies may view them as 
disloyal traitors.  Despite their reputation, it can hardly be argued that whistleblowers do not 
provide a service that various sectors of society can enjoy. In terms of benefitting the public, 
whistleblowers have been instrumental in exposing malpractices that could harm health and 
overall well-being.  Thanks to their efforts, appropriate safety measures have been put in place to 
protect the public from harm.    
 Whistleblowers can also benefit their companies by saving them money, especially in 
current economic situation. As the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2009) notes, 
“fraud levels are expected to continue rising as fraud thrives in times of economic turmoil (p. 8-
10).  In times of economic difficulty, layoffs become increasingly more common and 
consequently leave holes in internal control systems (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 
2009).  A 2008 study by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, found that, based on a 
sample of nearly 1000 cases of occupational fraud, “a lack of adequate internal controls was 
most commonly cited as the factor that allowed fraud to occur” (p. 5).  Whistleblowers are 
instrumental in exposing this fraud. Cynthia Cooper (2008) underlines that, on average, financial 
statement frauds continue for 25  months before being detected, and tips by whistleblowers serve 
as the primary means for fraud detection. 
 Given its wide range of benefits, whistleblowing should be promoted.  Though the short 
term results of whistleblowing may be daunting, especially for companies engaged in 
wrongdoing, the long term benefits are substantial.  As Miceli et al. (1999) emphasize, 
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“wrongdoing has negative consequences for the organization, its members, and society as a 
whole,” but whistleblowers have the potential to ameliorate some of these injuries (p.129).     
 
 
Benefits to the Public 
  
 As Earle and Madek (2007) suggest, “whistleblowers have a special place in American 
culture.” They provide the example of Deep Throat, the whistleblower in the Watergate scandal, 
in order to demonstrate society’s fixation on whistleblowing (Earle and Madek, 2007).  Perhaps 
one of the most notorious American whistleblowers, Deep Throat became the center of intense 
speculation both during and even after the Watergate scandal.  It therefore comes as almost no 
surprise that the American public is intrigued by whistleblowers because of their willingness to 
contribute to the societal good, despite the potential consequences they may suffer as a result it.  
As Harry Markopolos (2010) emphasizes, “whistleblowers in this country generally have a very 
difficult time, but the provide a tremendous service. . .” (p. 230).      
 As actors working to implement change, early scholars tended to take the position that 
whistleblowers were purely motivated by altruism, disregarding potential retaliation or 
repercussions (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).  More recently, however, experts tend to view the act of 
whistleblowing as a prosocial behavior, a social behavior that Staub explains as an action that is 
meant to benefit others while at the same time gaining rewards for oneself (as cited in Dozier & 
Miceli, 1985).  Despite specific motivations, there exists a general consensus that most 
whistleblowing activity is well-intentioned, and it serves as an impetus for raised public 
consciousness of potential hazards.   
 One of the primary benefits of whistleblowing is the power to inform others (Elliston et 
al., 1985a).  Employees have a direct connection to the inner-workings of an organization and are 
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sometimes the only people with access to crucial information about the type of practices 
observed within that group.  As such, the exposure of dangerous policies and public risks is often 
reliant on their willingness to blow the whistle.  As Glazer and Glazer (1989) explain, 
whistleblowers “serve as the bellwethers of emerging social problems” (p. 250).  It is thanks to 
their efforts that public attention has been drawn to issues such as the contamination of meat and 
the warnings of salmonella poisoning, the dangers of nuclear energy, and the serious side effects 
of certain medications (Glazer & Glazer, 1989). The public continues to rely on ethical resisters 
to expose future problems related to consumer safety, environmental degradation, and public 
health (Glazer & Glazer, 1989).   
 In essence, whistleblowers sacrifice loyalty to the organization in favor of the common 
good (Glazer & Glazer, 1989).  To demonstrate this behavior, Laurence Barton (1995) provides 
examples of two whistleblowers—Daniel Ellsberg, who released the secret government 
documents known as The Pentagon Papers, and Karen Silkwood, a technician at Kerr-McGee 
Company in Oklahoma, who blew the whistle on worker contamination at a nuclear power plant.  
Barton highlights that, “these are two of several hundred whistleblowers whose acts of courage 
helped to change the way society thought and acted upon questionable public and corporate 
policies” (p. 160).  By forgoing fidelity to their organization and pledging allegiance to the 
public good, whistleblowers like Ellsberg and Silkwood have the potential to make important 
changes.  In fact, as Barton (1995) underlines, in most cases courts have actually dismissed the 
notion that whistleblowers are disloyal, and suggest instead that the whistleblower “can often 
serve as the progenitor for change in public policy” (p. 305).   
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Benefits to the Organization 
  
 Though the public may perceive a whistleblower as a hero, he or she is not always 
framed in such a positive light within their organization. Unfortunately, whistleblowing within 
an organization is often unwelcome, and whistleblower concerns are often buried and ignored 
(Miceli et al., 1991). Barton suggests that coworkers feel that the whistleblower undermines the 
spirit of the team, and whistleblowers are therefore often perceived by the organization as being 
disloyal, or “another kind of enemy within” (p. 305). While this may be a common sentiment 
among co-workers, it is the case that, if dealt with properly, whistleblowers can actually benefit 
the organization at which they work.  
 For an organization, perhaps one of the most advantageous consequences of blowing the 
whistle is the opportunity to locate and change corporate practices that lead to the wrongdoing 
(Elliston et al., 1985a).  Since most whistleblowers that used external measures to blow the 
whistle used internal measures first (Miceli & Near, 1985), organizations have the opportunity to 
consider the whistleblower’s concerns and make appropriate adjustments to current practice 
before the whistleblower “goes public”.  As Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) contend, 
internal channels are usually less threatening than external reporting which can invite legal 
consequences and public scrutiny (p. 278). As such, Miceli and Near (1988) convey that 
organizations can “avoid the negative consequences that may result from external reporting” (p. 
268).  
 As such, whistleblowing can serve as a type of precautionary measure. Barton (1995) 
explains that whistleblowing can “identify workers and managers who act illegally or immorally, 
send a message throughout the organization that unethical behavior will not be tolerated, and 
alert coworkers that their valid complaints about other abuses will also be heard and adjudicated” 
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(p. 305). By encouraging and engaging in dialogue with disconcerted employees, management 
can actively seek to find solutions for the wrongdoings whistleblowers expose.   
 Miceli et al. (1991) express that though there is a possibility that whistleblowing may 
threaten organizational authority structures (Weinstein, 1979), in the long run, organizational 
effectiveness can be improved because whistleblowers may suggest solutions to organizational 
problems (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986).  Because employees are immersed in the day-to-day 
functions of their organization, they can help locate organizational inefficiencies and suggest 
possible adjustments.  Ellston et al. (2005) explain that, “the direction of change in any 
organizational system is only partially determined by management” while “the other sources are 
found within internal and external processes” (p. 38).  Ellston et al. (2005) contend that 
whistleblowers can fill this external vacuum and serve as an “organizational guidance through 
nonformal channels of influence” (p. 38). Whistleblowers can help organizations to adapt to a 
changing environment and highlight matters of concern.  
 Organizations can also benefit from whistleblowing from a material perspective. 
Organizations can protect themselves from financial losses by implementing anti-fraud controls 
such as whistleblowing encouragement programs.  The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(2008) found that the use anti-fraud controls seemed to have a significant impact on an 
organization’s exposure to fraud citing that, “organizations that [had fraud controls and] 
conducted surprise audits suffered a median loss of $70,000, while those that did not had a 
median loss of $207,000” (p. 5).  Therefore, by implementing measures such as anonymous 
hotlines and employee support programs, organizations can minimize material losses 
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008). 
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 With American organizations losing as much as 7% of their annual revenue to fraud, a 
median loss amounting to $175,000, it becomes clear why whistleblowers serve such an 
indispensible purpose.  On a national scale, fraud was responsible for approximately $994 billion 
in loses in 2008, with small businesses being particularly vulnerable to fraud (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2008).  Whistleblowers are instrumental in exposing these potential 
losses and can therefore be a great asset to their organizations.  They can also alert the public to 
the misallocation of funds as well as other harmful company practices.   
 
Benefits to the Current Economic Situation 
 
 Whistleblowers play a prominent role in revealing wide-scale corporate fraud, and the 
increase in exposure of fraudulent activity during the past decade can in large part be attributed 
to the work of whistleblowers.  In fact, a recent study seeking to measure the effectiveness of 
various methods of identifying corporate fraud concluded that whistleblowers proved to be the 
most effective monitors in detecting fraud (Kim, 2009). Markopolos (2010) underlines this 
notion by articulating that, “whistleblower tips are 13 times more effective than external 
auditing” (p. 230).    
 By exposing fraud, the Office of the Whistleblower of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission asserts that whistleblowers can aid in: “minimizing the harm to investors, better 
preserving the integrity of the United States’ capital markets, and more swiftly holding 
accountable those responsible for unlawful conduct” (Office of the Whistleblower, 2011).  In 
addition to minimizing the harm to investors, whistleblowers are also capable of restoring 
investor confidence (Kim, 2009).  
 
 
	   39 
Chapter 5: The History of Whistleblower Legislation   
 
 
 Given the wide range of benefits provided by whistleblowing, it is easy to see why 
society would wish encourage this type of behavior.  However, because the consequences 
associated with whistleblowing can be extremely high, drafting laws aimed at encouraging 
whistleblowing and protecting whistleblowers have faced significant difficulties.   
It is not uncommon for organizations to retaliate against whistleblowers by invoking such 
measures as dismissal, transfer, blacklisting, and personal harassment (Glazer & Glazer, 1989). 
Glazer and Glazer (1989) also note that whistleblowers face “the harsh reality of disrupted 
careers and family stress (p. 133),” and Alford (2001) suggests that, “most are in some way 
broken. . . and unable to come to terms with what they have learned about the world” (p. 1). The 
often grave aftermath of whistleblowing begs the question whether laws protecting 
whistleblowing are at all feasible. 
 
Federal Whistleblower Protections 
 The first mention of whistleblower protection in a legal context appeared almost a 
century and a half ago.  The First Amendment in junction with the Civil Rights Act of 1871 
established that employees of state and local governments had the right to obtain both monetary 
and injunctive relief if they were discriminated against on the basis of First-Amendment-
protected whistleblowing (Kohn, 2001).  However, the types of activities protected under these 
measures were relatively restricted, and it was not until nearly a century later that more 
encompassing whistleblower laws were enacted.   
 The first of these, the Civil Service Reform Act, was enacted in 1978 and established the 
first statutory cause of action which protected whistleblowers from employer retaliation 
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(Ebersole, 2011). Though the Civil Service Reform Act provided a foundation for future 
whistleblower laws, it had relatively little impact because its provisions were limited to 
protecting federal employees (Ebersole, 2011).  As a result, Congress enacted the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989 which had a three-fold objective: (1) it established a separate agency to 
litigate claims; (2) allowed individuals to file whistleblower claims without government support; 
and (3) permitted attorneys’ fees to be shifted from whistleblowers to plaintiffs (Ebersole, 2011).  
All of these measures greatly expanded whistleblower protection.   
 In the meantime, the federal government made important amendments to the False 
Claims Act, which was originally enacted in 1863 during the Civil War to control fraud in 
defense contracts (Kohn, 2001).  In its enactment, lawmakers revived the tradition of qui tam 
which allowed private citizens, also known as relators, to bring lawsuits on the government’s 
behalf in exchange for monetary compensation (Constantine Cannon, 2005). The False Claims 
Act was not used again extensively until World War II, which precipitated the reform of the Act 
in 1943.  As Thomas L. Harris (2009) notes, the revision of the Act was prompted by “the 
exploitation of the Act by opportunistic informers,” and almost lead to a repeal of the quit tam 
provisions (p. 1299).  The reform stopped short of an outright appeal but severely restricted 
relator’s ability to recover compensation under the False Claims Act, insisting that he or she 
provide information and evidence that the government did not already possess (Harris, 2009). 
Additionally, the revisions restricted the amount of compensation available to a whistleblower.   
 In 1986, Congress reversed their prior reforms and significantly amended the FCA 
(Harris, 2009) amid widespread reports of outlandish abuses by government contractors 
(Constantine Cannon, 2005).  Some contracting agencies were found to charge $400 for 
hammers, $1,000 for bolts, and $7,000 for coffee pots (Constantine Cannon, 2005). The 
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amendments sought to incentivize relators to come forward, most notably by increasing the 
whistleblower’s share of compensation in a successful suit (Harris, 2009). The new amendments 
also made it possible for relators to be reimbursed for attorney’s fees, and other reasonable costs 
(Harris, 2009).  Harris (2009) also notes that, overall, the reforms made it easier to bring qui tam 
suits because the Act no longer required “proof of specific intent to defraud,” but imposed 
liability on the defendants even if they acted simply with “deliberate ignorance” or “reckless 
disregard of the truth of falsity” of the information provided to the government (p. 1300).   
 The amendments were relatively successful in increasing FCA suits, at least until the late 
1990s (Harris, 2009).  As Constantine Cannon (2005) cites, “by the mid-1990s, hundreds of 
millions of dollars were being returned to the government through the False Claims Act every 
year, with tens of millions of dollars going to whistleblowers” and by 2000, “these annual 
recoveries crossed into the billions.” It is important to note that the False Claims Act only applies 
to federal money, but a number of states have passed their own version of the FCA, almost 
identical to the original (Kohn, 2001).   
 More recently, President Obama’s signing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA) further extended the ramifications of the False Claims Act.  Previously, the FCA’s 
public disclosure bar prevented potential whistleblowers from profiting from the exposure of 
fraud that had already been exposed or that had reached the public domain (Berger and 
Montague, 2013). The PPACA, however, expands the FCA’s reach and weakens the public 
disclosure bar by using a more flexible standard (Santo, 2010).  For example, the new public 
disclosure bar does not consider information disclosed in private and state proceedings to be 
“privately disclosed,” (Berger and Montague, 2013) thereby decreasing the amount of instances 
in which a whistleblower’s suit can be dismissed (Santo, 2010).  Furthermore, as Santo (2010) 
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underlines, “the PPACA extends the scope of the original source exception.” This means that the 
whistleblower’s allegations can now be grounded in secondhand information as long as they add 
to the information already present in the public domain (Santo, 2010).  Previously, the FCA only 
allowed relators to bring forth a suit if they had “direct and independent knowledge” of the 
information provided (Santo, 2010).     
 The most recent revision to the False Claims Act was initiated in July of 2010 in what is 
known as the Dodd-Frank Act.  Passed in response to the financial meltdown of the late 2000s, 
the Dodd-Frank Act sought to ameliorate some of the shortcomings of the FCA by including 
financial incentives as well as retaliation protection for whistleblowers (Constantine Cannon, 
2013). The provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act as well as its strengths and weakness will be 
examined in detail in a later chapter.    
 
Industry Specific Whistleblower Protections 
 Additional whistleblower protection statutes that are particular to certain industries have 
also been passed in recent decades.  A nuclear law as well as a number of environmental laws 
such as the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Act, and the Toxic Substances Act (Elliston, 
Keenan, Lockhart, & van Schaick, 1985b) protect employees who report violations of 
environmental or nuclear safety regulations to public authorities (Kohn, 2001).  Laws protecting 
whistleblowers in workplace safety cases have also been implemented and enforced through 
regulatory committees such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (Kohn, 2001).  Furthermore, federal statutory 
protections for whistleblowers have been put into effect in very specific cases that range from 
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airline safety to mine health safety to protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, 
just to name a few (Kohn, 2001).   
 In 1970, The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) was passed in order to 
ensure that employers provide employees with a safe and healthy workplace, and the act 
contained a number of whistleblower protections in order to ensure that this goal was met.  An 
OSHA factsheet (2013) underscores that the Act protects employees who report unsafe 
conditions and guarantees that the employee “cannot be transferred, denied a raise, have hours 
reduced, be fired, or punished in any other way” as a result of voicing their concerns.  The 
United States Department of Labor (2009) explains that the Act covers employees in an array of 
different fields by articulating a broad understanding of “employer,” defining him or her to be 
any “person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees.” If the employer is 
found guilty, OSHA will “require the employer to reinstate the employee, pay back wages, 
restore benefits and [make available] other possible remedies to make the employee whole.”  
 As Richard Alaniz (2013) explains, in recent years, OSHA has been working on 
restructuring their whistleblower program by making changes to their program policy and 
internal systems in order to strengthen the enforcement of its whistleblower protections.  In 2012 
budget, OSHA sought to create more visibility for whistleblowing activity and added 25 new 
investigators to investigate whistleblowers’ claims (Alaniz, 2013).  It has also changed its 
training methods such as including a national whistleblower training conference for 
whistleblower investigators (Alaniz, 2013). As expected, the restructuring lead to an increase of 
whistleblower claims as well as an increase in the number of OSHA determinations. As Chinn et 
al. (2013) cite, “the number of whistleblower cases submitted to OSHA in fiscal year 2012 was 
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2,787, up 5% from 2011, and the number of complaint determinations made by OSHA increased 
by 42%.”   
 Despite these efforts, there seems to exist a general consensus that whistleblowers are 
still not adequately protected nor can they come forward with incriminating evidence without 
fear of retaliation.  Kohn (2001) suggests that, “the failure of Congress to pass comprehensive 
legislation adequately covering employees who “blow the whistle” on illegal governmental or 
corporate conduct is the single most remarkable deficiency in the protection of legitimate 
whistleblower activity” (p. 79). Alford (2001) recounts his experience at a conference put on by 
the Governmental Accountability Project and mentions that all attorneys in attendance advised 
their clients not to blow the whistle because “it costs too much and it hurts too much”(p. 33).  
Even with efforts in place that prohibit retaliation against whistleblowers, most will nevertheless 
get fired and never work in the field again (Alford, 2001).             
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Chapter 6: Recent Developments in Whistleblower Law 
 
  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
 Recent developments in whistleblower legislation have sought to ameliorate some of the 
deficiencies exposed by past whistleblower laws.  According to Steinberg and Kaufman (2005), 
in 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) “in part to eliminate the patchwork 
and vagrancies of current state whistleblower laws” (p. 446).  Though the patchwork of state 
laws contributed to its enactment, the overriding reason for SOX’s implementation stemmed 
from the plethora of corporate fraud unearthed by corporations such as WorldCom, Enron, and 
Adelphia (Earle & Madek, 2007).  However, the swift enactment of SOX, passed by a vote of 
99-0 in Congress (Earle & Madek, 2007), may suggest that the government was more so 
motivated by a desire to rebuild investor confidence in the U.S. securities market (Kim, 2009), 
than in providing extended whistleblower protection.  
 Despite its intentions, SOX does provide extended protection for whistleblowers in 
comparison to the laws the preceding it.  Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, known as the 
Whistleblower Provision, protects employees of public corporations from discrimination and 
retaliation for reporting fraudulent activities (Kim, 2009).  In order to be protected by the 
Whistleblower Provision, the whistleblower must have a reasonable belief that the employer 
committed fraud, violated the Security and Exchange Commission regulations, or violated 
another federal provision related to fraud (Kim, 2009).  Regardless of whether the claim proves 
to be true, the whistleblower remains protected as long as he or she genuinely believed that the 
employer was engaged in fraudulent activities (Kim, 2009).  On the other hand, in order to report 
a retaliation claim, the whistleblower must provide three pieces of evidence: (1) the worker must 
be a part of a protected activity; (2) suffer negative employment action; (3) provide reasonable 
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cause that his or her exposure was a contributing factor to the employer’s negative employment 
action (Steinberg & Kaufman, 2005).          
 A series of remedies are made available to the whistleblower under SOX.  The act entitles 
relief that is necessary “to make the employee whole” and Steinberg and Kaufman (2005) 
explain that this type of relief includes “compensatory damages in the form of reinstatement with 
the same seniority, back pay with interest, and special damages including litigation costs, expert 
witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees” (p. 455).  The act, however, does not allow for 
punitive damages, and it does not mention damages associated with loss of reputation or pain and 
suffering (Kim, 2009).   
 In addition to the components of the statute that confront whistleblowers, there exist a 
series of provisions directed at public companies as well. For example, SOX mandates that the 
audit committees of public companies must develop and enforce procedures aimed at hearing 
whistleblower complaints (Steinberg & Kaufman, 2005).  Furthermore, if a person within the 
company discriminates or retaliates against the whistleblower, they can be held civilly liable for 
their unlawful action (Steinberg & Kaufman, 2005) and serve up to ten years in prison 
(Kerschberg, 2011). 
 Keeping in mind the billions of dollars spent collectively by public corporations to 
comply with SOX provisions as well as Congress’ intentions in the development of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the question remains whether SOX lived up to its expectations (Sweeney, 2005). Paul 
Sweeney (2005) notes that Sarbanes-Oxley is not the deal-closing statute that many lawmakers 
may have hoped for, and Kim (2009) underscores that the legislative branch has been incapable 
of protecting whistleblowers as it had intended.  One of the fundamental flaws in the 
Whistleblower Provision rests upon the decision to install the Occupational Safety and Health 
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Administration (OSHA) as the agency to administer whistleblower claims under SOX.  Though 
OSHA already administers some whistleblower statues, it is mainly concerned with matters of 
labor and employment (Kim 2009).  Sarbanes-Oxley requires OSHA to investigate matters 
outside of their usual arena (Earle & Madek, 2007), and they do not have the proper training or 
experience to deal with the intricacies of fraud (Kim, 2009).  Earle and Madek (2007) assume 
that because OSHA already managed a series of other whistleblower statutes, Congress simply 
decided to extend OSHA’s oversight; they advance the belief that cost was clearly a factor in this 
decision.    
 Yet another flaw of SOX can be located in its procedural difficulties (Kim, 2009).  The 
procedure of filing a grievance under SOX, for example, has been particularly confusing due to 
its strict time restrictions.  In its original form, the statute of limitations to file a retaliation claim 
was only 90 days, and the statute of limitations period began when the whistleblower became 
aware of the employer’s intention of implementing adverse employment actions, and not when 
the action was actually implemented (Kim, 2009).  (This time restraint was changed to 180 days 
in the Dodd-Frank Act, which will be explained in the upcoming section.)  
 Additionally, though SOX outlined a series of mandates for public companies, they have 
not always abided by these rules which exposes yet another weakness in Sarbanes-Oxley 
(Sweeney, 2005).  Toby Bishop, the past president of The Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, asserts that companies that are determined to engage in fraudulent activities can 
“override” the controls put in place by SOX, and that despite the resources spent to comply with 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, whistleblower programs have not been a high priority (Sweeney, 
2005).          
	   48 
 There is also a question as to whether the whistleblower in a retaliation case actually 
holds the advantage over their employer when filing a case.  It arises from a component of the 
provision stating that the whistleblower’s employer must only provide evidence that he or she 
would have undertaken the same measures (i.e. demotion, transfer, discharge, etc.) against the 
whistleblower regardless of the whistleblower’s conduct (Earle & Madek, 2007). Disputes as to 
who carries the heavier burden of proof, the whistleblower or the employer, are common among 
scholars.  Some argue that the whistleblower is at a disadvantage because he or she must provide 
proof of three factors in the retaliation claim (as explained above) while the employer must only 
fulfill one (Kim, 2009).  On the other hand, some argue that the employer is at a disadvantage 
because he or she may genuinely want to demote, transfer, or discharge an unsatisfactory 
employee but when this employee also happens to be a whistleblower, the employer may incur 
unjustified liabilities (Steinberg & Kaufman, 2005).   
 Though Sarbanes-Oxley did not improve whistleblower protection as much as many had 
hoped, proponents of SOX argue that is was successful in a different manner—it changed the 
business environment in the United States (Sweeney, 2005).   Following the widely-publicized 
cases of corporate fraud, investors may have been hesitant to put faith in the market.  However, 
by providing an additional level of government oversight, Sweeney (2005) suggests that SOX 
“helped scrub a tarnished image of corporate America” (p. 23).   
 In line with this argument, Earle and Madek (2007) execute a more disparaging analysis 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by suggesting that its enactment served only as window-dressing for 
the concern of whistleblowers.  In their opinion, the “unusual rapidity” of Congress to pass this 
statute “signals that perhaps Congress had not carefully considered all the provisions. . .and 
perhaps the Senate simply wanted a quick fix that allowed it to appear decisive, rather that 
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choosing inaction or filibuster” (Earle & Madek, 2007, p. 4).  Earle and Madek (2005) question 
whether SOX merely promised a “mirage of safety,” and they suspect that Congress simply 
wanted to appear proactive, but it essentially allowed companies to continue business as usual (p. 
3).   
 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act 
  
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, more commonly 
known as the Dodd-Frank Act, was enacted in 2010 in an attempt to prevent the recurrence of the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 (King, 2011) by creating an improved financial regulatory system 
that enforces accountability and transparency (Rouse, 2011). As cited by Kerschberg (2011), the 
Dodd-Frank Act seeks to reward whistleblowers “who bring violations of securities law, 
commodities law, or the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the attention of the proper government 
authorities—the Securities Exchange Commission, the Department of Justice, or the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission.”  
 Partially in response to the Madoff and Stanford ponzi scheme, the Dodd-Frank Act 
greatly expanded upon the whistleblower protection offered by Sarbanes-Oxley (Ebersole, 2011). 
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the whistleblower provisions set forth in SOX in the 
following ways: (1) expands whistleblower protection to employees of all subsidiaries and 
affiliates of the public company, not exclusively the employees of the public company (Ebersole, 
2011); (2) extends Sarbanes-Oxley’s statute of limitations from 90 to 180 days (King, 2011); (3) 
prohibits retaliation against an employee, regardless of whether the employee reasonably 
believed that the conduct exposed was unlawful (SOX only protected internal whistleblowers if 
the individual reasonably believed the conduct was unlawful) (The Network, 2011); and (4) 
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allows a whistleblower to file a retaliation complaint directly in federal court (The Network, 
2011).  
 The major difference between Sarbanes-Oxley and the Dodd-Frank Act is that the Dodd-
Frank Act offers a financial reward for whistleblowing (Kerschberg, 2011). In order to provide 
monetary incentives for potential whistleblowers, Congress created the Whistleblower Program, 
and, subsequently, The Office of the Whistleblower was established to monitor the program 
(Office of The Whistleblower, 2011).  According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the Whistleblower Program allows the Commission to provide the whistleblower with 10-30% 
bounty of the total monetary sanctions that the Commission collects in response to the 
whistleblower’s claim, as long as the sanctions yield more than $1 million (Office of the 
Whistleblower, 2011). By providing both monetary incentives and anti-retaliation protection, the 
hope is that the Dodd-Frank Act is more comprehensive in its coverage and more enticing for 
potential whistle-blowers than Sarbanes-Oxley.  
 Because the Dodd-Frank Act did not go into effect until 2010, and the final rules 
regarding the implementation of the Whistleblower Program did not take effect until August 12, 
2011, we are still in the beginning stages of accessing its success.  Ebersole (2011), however, 
notes that early reports suggest that whistleblower tips have increased significantly since Dodd 
Frank’s enactment, but more time is needed to evaluate their quality.  Nevertheless, criticisms of 
the act have already emerged, specifically in the installment of the bounty.  As Ebersole (2011) 
logically suggests, individuals are more likely to report misconduct if they find it to be morally 
reprehensible, and, as such, monetary incentives would be most effective in situations where the 
conduct is not viewed as morally reprehensible.  Because whistleblowing entails the reporting of 
behavior that is deemed morally reprehensible, the Whistleblower Program can be seen as both 
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frivolous and ineffective.  Ebersole (2011) even suggests that the monetary incentives can prove 
detrimental because they may propel a flood of low quality tips and result in unnecessary and 
excessive litigation.   
 Nevertheless, there have been some breakthroughs made with the help of the Dodd Frank 
Act. Protess and Popper (2013) cite lawyers who have commented that, with the help of 
whistleblowers, they were able to discover large scale ponzi schemes and fraudulent activities at 
some of the largest stock trading firms on Wall Street.  Despite these successes, however, the 
Dodd Frank Act still faces a number of challenges.  Some lawyers contend that The Office of the 
Whistleblower takes weeks or sometimes months before responding to whistleblower tips while 
others think that the SEC may be overstating the power of the whistleblower program (Protess & 
Proper, 2013).   
 Other obstacles to the enforcement of the whistleblower provisions stem from 
organizations themselves, some of which implement policies that violate the spirit of the 
program (Protess & Proper, 2013). David Marshall, a founder of a whistle-blower law firm, 
explains that some companies discretely insert language in its contracts that essentially stop the 
whistleblower from going to the SEC (As cited by Protess and Proper, 2013).  Employees are 
often not aware of these provisions of their contracts, and it they chose to use external measures 
of whistleblowing, they are barred from doing so under contract. Of course, the successes of the 
Dodd-Frank Act should not be overlooked, but only time will tell whether its failures can be 
ameliorated.     
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Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act 
 
 In November of 2012, President Obama signed into law the most recent piece of 
whistleblower legislation—the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA). The 
WPEA made whistleblower protections stronger as it updated some of the weak and outdated 
provisions of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (Government Accountability Project, 
2013). Overall, as Samuel Rubenfield (2012) of the Wall Street Journal notes, “the law expands 
protections for federal workers who blow the whistle on misconduct, fraud and illegality.” 
 According to a statement released by the White House (2012), “the WPEA amends 
whistleblower protections for Federal employees by: clarifying the scope of protected 
disclosures; tightening requirements for non-disclosure agreements; expanding the penalties 
imposed for violating whistleblower protections; and establishing a Whistleblower Protection 
Ombudsmen in certain agencies.”  The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act also made 
significant strides in terms of protecting whistleblowers from reprisal.  Dylan Blaylock (2012) 
emphasizes that federal employees are protected from retaliation if they, “are not the first person 
to disclose misconduct; disclose misconduct to coworkers or supervisors; disclose the 
consequences of a policy decision; or blow the whistle while carrying out their job duties.” 
 President Obama has been widely praised for championing this historical whistleblower 
protection law.  As Tom Devine (2013), the Legal Director of the Government Accountability 
Project, has noted, “no other president has come close to President Obama on strengthening 
whistleblower job rights.” It is therefore particularly ironic that, in recent months, Obama’s 
administration has been harshly criticized for both its failure to protect whistleblowers as well as 
its increasingly severe treatment of them.  In the recent film War on Whistleblowers, David Carr 
(2013) of the New York Times laments that, “the Obama administration came to power 
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promising the most transparent administration in history…and began prosecuting 
[whistleblowers] every which way” (as cited by Tom Devine, 2013).     
 Some believe that the administration has cracked down on federal whistleblowing under 
the pretext of national security. Devine (2013) cites that, “the Obama administration has attacked 
more national security whistleblowers as Espionage Act criminals than all previous 
administrations combined, lumping them with spies.”  Calderone and Sledge (2013) observe that 
whistleblowers have been “fired, prosecuted or shunned” for exposing the inefficiencies in 
military projects.  Devine (2013) argues that the dangers of this approach are particularly severe. 
He articulates that national security whistleblowers are the ones society needs the most because 
they expose threats from our own government (Devine, 2013).  Jonathan Landay, a veteran 
national security reporter attests that the environment for exposing this type of wrongdoing has 
shrunk because “the crackdown on leaks seems deliberately intended to have a chilling affect” 
(as cited by Calderone and Sledge, 2013).   
 Currently, the Justice Department and the Defense Department are arguing in favor of 
further restrictions on federal employees.  Josh Gernstein (2013) explains that the Departments 
take the position that, “federal employees…who don’t have access to classified information, can 
be demoted or effectively fired without recourse to the usual avenues of appeal if their jobs are 
designated as “sensitive.”  Critics argue that if ordinary, federal jobs are deemed “sensitive,” 
then “almost any job at any agency could be designated as such” (Gernstein, 2013).  This could 
remove federal workers’ whistleblower protections and grant agencies greater leniency in 
punishing employees who report wrongdoing (Gernstein, 2013).   
 Proponents of the measure, on the other hand, argue that this is a necessary precaution 
due to the nature of technology.  Federal employees like accountants or stockroom workers have 
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greater access to secretive computer databases which can pose a cyber-security, insider threat.  
The administration therefore finds itself in a difficult bind; it must strike the appropriate balance 
between national security concerns and whistleblower protection.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
 Current corporate practices elicit a sense of mistrust from the public, heightened by the 
exposure of corruption in various industries.  Instances of wasteful spending, fraudulent 
activities, and risky decision-making have surfaced into the public sphere, becoming almost a 
standard narrative of current business practices.  Though this is not a positive reflection of 
business proceedings, transparency is necessary to alert us into making appropriate changes.  To 
a certain extent, it is through the tribulations of whistleblowers that these wrongdoings have 
come to the public’s attention.  With firsthand knowledge of the misconduct, whistleblowers 
have been able to shed light on the misconduct they observe.     
 As analysts have articulated, we currently find ourselves in the age of the whistleblower 
(Chin et al., 2013). Whistleblowing is on the rise (Greenberger et al., 1987) and more of it is 
being brought to the attention of external actors (Chin et al., 2013).  As the thesis has articulated, 
the rise in whistleblowing should be welcomed as a positive phenomenon as whistleblowing can 
come to benefit to various sectors of society.  Not only the public but the organization itself can 
take advantage of the concerns whistleblowers expose.  Whistleblowers can bring attention to 
industries and practices in need of revision thereby jumpstarting the process of change.   
 Whistleblowers such as Cynthia Cooper and Harry Markopolos have served precisely as 
these initiators of change.  Thanks to their efforts and the grand scale misconduct they exposed, 
the government made appropriate revisions to legal statutes aimed at impeding similar types of 
wrongdoing.  The wrongdoing unearthed by whistleblowers need not be of the same magnitude 
that Cooper and Markopolos exposed, however.  Smaller scale whistleblowing is also beneficial 
as it can prompt organizations to restructure ineffective or unfair arrangements.  Because 
	   56 
whistleblowers are immersed in the work environment, they are better able to identify problems 
than, for instance, external monitoring agencies (Cooper, 2008).     
 The road to initiating change, however, is a difficult.  This thesis has presented the 
whistleblowing process as an arduous one as the whistleblower finds themselves in a morally 
complex situation. The series of considerations a potential whistleblower must undergo is 
extensive and tiring.  He or she must consider the possible consequences of their actions and 
question the extent of retaliation they will receive.  With this in mind, it is impressive that 
individuals nevertheless decide to blow the whistle in pursuit of the greater good.  Whether the 
whistleblower is only seeking to change organizational practices or whether they are concerned 
about the greater good of the public, whistleblowing can hardly be seen as a selfish act (Dozier & 
Miceli, 1985). 
 In fact, whistleblowers sacrifice organizational loyalty with the hopes that their 
temporary “discretion” brings about positive change.  Because of this, their coworkers and 
superiors may see the whistleblower as a type of traitor.  It is important to understand, however, 
that the decision to blow the whistle is not an easy one and it is usually made with the belief that 
the exposure of misconduct will not only be welcomed, but that the wrongdoing will be 
eradicated (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005).  Managers, however, do not always make 
the appropriate adjustments, and the whistleblower must decide whether to continue pushing 
their claim or abstain from further action.   
 Whistleblower’s value systems are continuously put to the test as they weight the cost 
and benefits of whether to blow the whistle.  They consider possible retaliation and make a 
decision of whether or not the exposure of the misconduct is worth the potential personal 
sacrifices.  Because the whistleblowing process is so demanding, whistleblowers tend to be 
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people of strong moral conviction with an unwavering commitment to their value system (Glazer 
& Glazer, 1989).  As the thesis has explained, a series of other personal factors also contribute to 
a person’s decision to blow the whistle.  It seems almost intuitive that this category of people 
would share certain common characteristics. Situational factors are also partially responsible for 
prompting whistleblowing. As social beings, we are influenced by our surroundings and 
whistleblowers are equally influenced by the context in which they find themselves.             
 Based on the above considerations, it is clear that the phenomenon of whistleblowing is 
multifaceted and complex. In order to make the process less difficult, legislators have attempted 
to construct laws that will both protect whistleblowers and encourage other potential 
whistleblowers to come forward.  It has become evident, however, that this is not an easily 
attainable feat.  The drafting of effective whistleblower legislation has proved to be very 
challenging and despite numerous efforts, it is still far from ideal.   
 Though whistleblower laws are not perfect, it should not be overlooked that the 
government nevertheless understands the whistleblowing process to be beneficial. Since the 19th 
century, the government has sought to develop ways to encourage whistleblowing, 
acknowledging that the services whistleblower provide are unique and in their best interest.  
Originally, whistleblowers helped the government detect instances of fraud in government 
contracts, and since then, whistleblower legislation has expanded to encompass much more 
(Kohn, 2001).   
 A number of laws have been enacted and consistently revised to meet whistleblower 
concern.  Legislation such as the False Claims Act, for example, has been revised a number of 
times to accommodate developing factors in the whistleblowing process.  Provisions of the 
widely discussed Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act include explicit measures meant 
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to protect and encourage whistleblowers.  Most recently, President Obama signed a revised 
version of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, now named the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act, which is meant to broaden the scope of action protected against retaliation 
(Blaylock, 2012).  Clearly, whistleblower legislation has moved with the times as it attempts to 
ameliorate deficiencies of past laws.   
 Even though legislation aims to accommodate whistleblowing, it seems as if there exists 
an inherent flaw in this approach. Whistleblower legislation often comes short of meeting its 
stated goals and constant revisions are necessary to meet these shortcomings.  This pattern on 
constant revision leads one to wonder when the revision will stop and no longer be necessary.  
Perhaps, however, whistleblower legislation will never be able to guarantee whistleblowers total 
protection from retaliation.  Even with more stringent punishments for retaliation, employers 
have found ways to circumvent the rules.  Whistleblowers today may have a better chance of 
seeking redress from the government, but this does not change the fact that they are not immune 
from retaliation.    
 Whistleblowers and researchers alike have proposed different means of encouraging 
whistleblowing.  Cynthia Cooper (2008) noted, for example, that the use internal controls might 
be the best way to expose wrongdoing in the workplace. Cooper (2008) underlined that “tips by 
employees tend to be the primary means of fraud detection” and emphasized the importance of 
using an “anonymous fraud hotline” (p. 297).  Researchers have also praised efforts such as 
encouraging open communication within the workplace.  Gundlach et al. (2008) emphasize that, 
“organizations must have open channels of communication in place that enable employees to 
report workplace acts they perceive as questionable and that assist them in understanding how 
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these acts were cause” (p. 46). These types of measures can allow for managers and potential 
whistleblowers to discuss concerns in a safe setting. 
     
Moving Forward 
 With the state of whistleblowing as we find it in today, it is worthwhile to consider what 
we can expect from this phenomenon in the future.  The obstacles that whistleblowers face and 
the retaliation they often experience may prompt some to believe that whistleblowing will 
remain in its current state or potentially decline.  Though this is a valid opinion, the type of 
society we find ourselves in may suggest that the opposite is true.  With increased media scrutiny 
and the proliferation of watchdog groups, it has become the norm to expose scandals almost on a 
daily basis.  Watchdog groups such as WikiLeaks, for example, thrive on anonymous tips and the 
amount of information they have exposed shows employees want the public to be aware of 
misconduct.     
 This type of environment will continue to make the exposure of scandals of more 
acceptable and, subsequently, encourage more whistleblowing. In general, whistleblowers are 
praised by the public and hopefully the positive sympathies the media espouses towards 
whistleblowers will encourage potential whistleblowers to take action.  Furtherore, the fact that 
we live in a time of corporate suspicion may prompt potential whistleblowers to act on this 
distrustful view of corporate practices and lead them to expose misconduct.   
 Moreover, the quick paced nature of technological advances will make whistleblowing 
even easier.  With more sophisticated systems and enhanced electronics at our disposal, it will 
become easier to document employer malpractices. For example, cellphones with video or voice 
recording capabilities can capture misconduct without raising any suspicions.  The 
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interconnectedness of computer systems can also facilitate whistleblowing.  Employees have 
access to extensive databases that might contain “sensitive” information, or evidence of the 
organization’s wrongdoing.    With the above considerations in mind, it follows that the 
phenomenon of whistleblowing is hardly going to decline or remain stagnant.   In fact, it will 
only continue to gain speed.              
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